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Abstract
In the compulsive gambler process there is a finite set of agents who
meet pairwise at random times (i and j meet at times of a rate-νij Poisson
process) and, upon meeting, play an instantaneous fair game in which one
wins the other’s money. We introduce this process and describe some of
its basic properties. Some properties are rather obvious (martingale struc-
ture; comparison with Kingman coalescent) while others are more subtle
(an “exchangeable over the money elements” property, and a construction
reminiscent of the Donnelly-Kurtz look-down construction). Several direc-
tions for possible future research are described. One – where agents meet
neighbors in a sparse graph – is studied here, and another – a continuous-
space extension called the metric coalescent – is studied in Lanoue (2014).
1 Introduction
The style of models known to probabilists as Interacting Particle Systems (IPS)
[11] have found use in many fields across the mathematical and social sciences.
Often the underlying conceptual picture is of a social network, where individ-
ual “agents” meet pairwise and update their “state” (opinion, activity etc) in a
way depending on their previous states. This picture motivates a precise gen-
eral setup we call Finite Markov Information Exchange (FMIE) processes [1].
Consider a set Agents of n agents and a nonnegative array (νij), indexed by
unordered pairs {i, j}, which is irreducible (i.e. the graph of edges corresponding
to strictly positive entries is connected). Assume
• Each unordered pair i, j of agents with νij > 0 meets at the times of a
rate-νij Poisson process, independent for different pairs.
Call this collection of Poisson processes the meeting process; the array (νij)
specifies the meeting model. A specific FMIE is a specific rule (deterministic
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or random) for updating states, so this encompasses most of the familiar IPS
models such as the voter model and contact process. But our emphasis differs
from the classical emphasis of IPS in several ways; the states are typically
numerical rather than categorical, the number n of agents is finite (though
we consider n → ∞ asymptotics) and we focus on obtaining rough results for
general meeting rates rather than sharp results for very specific meeting rates.
One specific FMIE model is the averaging process [2] in which agents initially
have different amounts of money; whenever two agents meet, they share their
combined money equally. In this paper we introduce and study a conceptually
opposite model, the compulsive gambler process. In the “simple” form of the
model, agents each start with one unit money. When two agents meet, if they
each have non-zero money (say amounts a and b) then they instantly play a
fair game in which one agent acquires the combined amount a + b (so with
probabilities a/(a+ b) and b/(a+ b)) respectively). In the “standardized” form
of the model the initial fortunes can be non-uniform, and we scale so that the
total money equals 1.
This is an invented model for which we do not claim realism1, but we do
claim some mathematical interest as an intermediary between IPS theory and
coalescent theory.
1.1 Elementary observations
First consider a fixed meeting model on n agents. Write X(t) = (Xi(t), i ∈
Agents) for the time-t configuration of the simple compulsive gambler process;
agent i has Xi(t) units of money. The following assertions are true, and mostly
obvious. We will give proofs, where necessary, and some crude quantifications
in section 2 (Lemmas 2.2 and 2.7).
(i) X(t) is a finite-state continuous-time Markov chain which, at some a.s. finite
random time T , reaches some absorbing configurationX∗ in which there is some
random non-empty set T of agents who are solvent, i.e. have non-zero money.
(ii) If νij > 0 for all j 6= i then |T | = 1 a.s., and we call T the fixation
time. Furthermore, because each (Xi(t), 0 ≤ t < ∞) is a martingale we have
P(T = {i}) = P(X∗i = n) = 1/n for each agent i.
(iii) If νij = 0 for some j 6= i then P(|T | = 1) is strictly between 0 and 1.
These facts suggest more quantitative questions to ask, in the setting of a se-
quence (ν
(n)
ij ) of meeting models with n→ ∞. How does T
(n) behave? In case
(iii), how do |T (n)| and the distribution P(X∗i ∈ ·|i ∈ T
(n)) of a typical “final
fortune” behave? In either case we can ask how the process of the number of
solvent agents
N(t) := |{i : Xi(t) > 0}|
behaves over 0 ≤ t ≤ T . If the meeting model has some spatial structure then
what can we say about the spatial structure of the set of solvent agents at time
t? We continue this discussion of research directions in section 1.3.
1Any perceived analogy between averaging/compulsive gambler models and social-
ism/capitalism is entirely the reader’s responsibility.
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1.2 Techniques
It turns out that a surprising variety of techniques can be exploited in the
study of the compulsive gambler process. Amongst these techniques, to be
described in section 2, the most natural are martingale results (Lemma 2.1)
and elementary bounds obtained by comparison with the Kingman coalescent
(e.g. Lemma 2.2). Less obvious is Lemma 2.3: instead of making the random
choices of game-winners at the meeting times, we can insert initial randomness
and then have a deterministic rule for game-winners. And in the “simple” case
that construction has a symmetry property (Lemma 2.5): the deterministic
rule is based on a uniform random labeling of initial currency notes as 1, . . . , n,
and conditional on the configuration of fortunes at time t, the allocation of
note-labels to agents is uniform random. This last method seems very similar
to methods used in the study of exchangeable coalescents [4, 5, 6], though the
precise relation is not clear to us and we have not used results from that theory.
1.3 Directions for future research
Our main purpose is to lay the groundwork for future research by describing
explicitly these techniques (section 2). In this paper we pursue analysis in only
one direction, by studying the setting where the meeting model is that agents
meet neighbors in a sparse graph (section 3). Here are some other directions of
current or future research.
The metric coalescent. This concerns a continuous-space extension. Take
a suitable space S, write P(S) for the space of probability measures µ on S and
write Pfs(S) ⊂ P(S) for the subspace of finite support probability measures.
Consider a symmetric function ν : S2 → R≥0. For any µ ∈ Pfs(S), we can
consider the standardized compulsive gambler process for which the set Agents
is the support {s1, . . . , sn} of µ, the meeting rates are the ν(si, sj), and the
initial distribution of money is µ; and moreover we can regard the states of the
process as elements of Pfs(S). So we can reconsider the standardized compulsive
gambler process as a Markov process, specified by the function ν, whose state
space is (all of) Pfs(S). Then we can ask, inspired by the Kingman coalescent
and its extensions [5], whether it makes sense to imagine this process starting
with a general (in particular, non-atomic) initial state µ0 ∈ P(S). This topic
is studied in detail in [10] in the context of a complete separable locally finite
metric space (S, d) and meeting rates of the form
ν(s, s′) = φ(d(s, s′))
for some continuous function φ(·) > 0. The main result of [10] is that, under
the condition limx↓0 φ(x) = ∞, the standardized compulsive gambler process
on Pfs(S) extends to a Feller process (the metric coalescent) on all of P(S). In
particular, for an initial µ0 ∈ P(S) with compact support, the metric coalescent
process (µt, 0 ≤ t < ∞) has finite support at each t0 > 0, evolves as the
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compulsive gambler process over [t0,∞) and satisfies the initial condition
P(lim
t↓0
µt = µ0 in P(S)) = 1.
A key ingredient in the proof is Corollary 2.4 below. In informal language,
Corollary 2.4 says that for the simple compulsive gambler process, instead of
determining the game winners at the meeting times, we can do so via initial ran-
domization, as follows. Initially each agent has a currency note with a random
serial number; when two solvent agents meet, each has a collection of notes, but
now the winner is always the owner of the lowest-ranked note, ranking by serial
number. In other words we start with a uniform random ordering s1, . . . , sn
of Agents, ranked by serial number of note. In the continuous-space setting
we can do the same construction but starting with i.i.d. (µ0) random samples
s1, . . . , sn. For each n we now have a Pfs(S)-valued process (µ
(n)
t , 0 ≤ t < ∞).
But as n varies these processes have a natural coupling and the metric coalescent
can be constructed as the a.s. n→∞ limit process.
Infinite discrete space. For a countable infinite set Agents, the simple
compulsive gambler process is well-defined under certain conditions, for instance
if
ν∗ := sup
i
∑
j 6=i
νij <∞. (1)
In particular, for an infinite vertex-transitive bounded degree graph, with meet-
ing rates νe ≡ 1 for edges e, there is a random set T of agents who remain
solvent in the t → ∞ limit, and one can seek to calculate the density P(i ∈ T )
of that set – see section 3 for the case of the r-regular tree. For another direction,
consider the case where Agents = Zd and the meeting rates are
νij = ||j − i||
−α (2)
for some α > d, implying (1). Consider the mean density of solvent agents at
time t
ρ(t) := P(Xi(t) 6= 0)
and the conditional distribution X∗(t) of Xi(t) given Xi(t) 6= 0, for which
EX∗(t) = 1/ρ(t) because EXi(t) ≡ 1. Heuristic arguments, based on supposing
the positions of solvent agents do not become “clustered”, suggest that
ρ(t) ≍ t−β for β = dα .
It is then plausible that
ρ(t)X∗(t)→d Z, for some Z such that EZ = 1
and then that the process has a scaling limit, the limit being a process whose
states are (locally finite support) measures on Rd.
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Other finite-agent meeting models. For the complete graphmeeting model
(νij ≡ 1) the compulsive gambler process is essentially just the Kingman coa-
lescent. On the d-dimensional discrete torus Zdm one could reconsider meeting
rates as at (2). By the heuristics above, for α > d we expect the fixation time
T to scale as ρ−1(m−d) = mα. In this setting it makes sense to consider also
the case α < d, but in this case an agent will tend to meet distant agents
rather than nearby ones, and by comparison with the Kingman coalescent we
expect T to scale as the total meeting rate
∑
j 6=i νij of a given agent, that is as
md−α. Finally, by the techniques of section 3 one can calculate the asymptotic
density (27) of solvent agents under the sparse Erdo˝s-Re´nyi meeting model, a
result which can alternatively be seen in terms of the short-time behavior of the
Kingman coalescent (section 3.3).
2 Four basic techniques
We now abbreviate “compulsive gambler” to CG. Fix a meeting model (νij) on
a set Agents of n agents. As in section 1.1, write X(t) = (Xi(t), i ∈ Agents)
for the time-t configuration of the CG process; agent i has Xi(t) units of money.
And write
N(t) := |{i : Xi(t) > 0}|
for the number of solvent agents. The CG process is specified by its transition
rates. For each ordered distinct pair (j, k) with min(xj , xk) > 0,
x→ x(j,k) at rate νjk
xj
xj+xk
; where (3)
x
(j,k)
i = xi, i 6= j, k; x
(j,k)
j = xj + xk; x
(j,k)
k = 0.
In full generality the state space conists of all configurations x = (x1, . . . , xn)
with xi ≥ 0 ∀i. For the simple CG process the initial state is Xi(0) = 1 ∀i ∈
Agents. For the standardized CG process there is an initial state x = (xi)
with xi ≥ 0 ∀i and
∑
i xi = 1. Clearly
∑
iXi(t) ≡ n in the simple case and∑
iXi(t) ≡ 1 in the standardized case. Results in this section 2 hold hold in
both simple and standardized cases unless otherwise stated.
2.1 Martingale properties
We first record some notation for the elementary stochastic calculus of integrable
bounded variation processes. Such a process (Zt) has a Doob-Meyer decompo-
sition Zt = Mt +At, where (Mt) is a martingale and (At) is predictable, which
can be written in differential notation as dZt = dMt+dAt. To avoid introducing
new symbols, we write E(dZt|Ft) for dAt.
Lemma 2.1. For any meeting process:
(i) (Xi(t), 0 ≤ t <∞) is a martingale.
(ii) For j 6= i, (Xi(t)Xj(t), 0 ≤ t <∞) is a supermartingale.
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(iii) For f : Agents → R write Mf(t) =
∑
i f(i)Xi(t). Given a metric d on
Agents write
Lf := max
j 6=i
|f(j)−f(i)|
d(i,j) , ν
∗ := max
j 6=i
νijd
2(i, j).
Then (Mf (t), 0 ≤ t <∞) is a martingale, and for a standardized CG process,
EM2f (t)−M
2
f (0) ≤
1
2ν
∗L2f t.
Proof. (i) and (ii) are straightforward. For (iii), Mf (·) is a martingale, and we
calculate
E(dM2f (t)|F(t)) = dt
∑
{i,j}
νijXi(t)Xj(t)(f(j) − f(i))
2,
the sum being over unordered pairs. From (ii) we have EXi(t)Xj(t) ≤ xixj ,
where x = (xi) is the initial configuaration, so taking expectation
E(dM2f (t)) ≤ dt ×
1
2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(ν∗d−2(i, j)× (Lfd(i, j))
2 × xixj)
= dt × 12ν
∗L2f
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
xixj
≤ dt × 12ν
∗L2f .
An explicit formula for EM2f (t) is given in Lemma 2.6.
2.2 The Kingman coalescent
In the particular case
νij = 1, j 6= i
of the meeting model, the compulsive gambler process is essentially the well-
studied Kingman coalescent [4]. In this case the process (N(t), 0 ≤ t <∞) is the
“pure death” Markov chain, started at n, with transition rates qm,m−1 =
(
m
2
)
,
from which it immediately follows that the fixation time
T := min{t : N(t) = 1} (4)
is a.s. finite with expectation
ET =
n∑
m=2
1/
(
m
2
)
= 2(1− n−1). (5)
Here is a simple application.
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Lemma 2.2. Consider a meeting model for which δ := minj 6=i νij > 0.
(i) The fixation time T satisfies ET ≤ 2/δ;
(ii) P(N(t) > r) ≤ 2rδt , r ≥ 2;
(iii) EN(t) ≤ Ctδ , 0 < t <∞ for some numerical constant C <∞;
(iv) Let L be the agent who has acquired all the money at time T . In the simple
CG process, P(L = i) = 1/n, ∀i ∈ Agents. In the standardized CG process
with initial configuration (xi), P(L = i) = xi, ∀i ∈ Agents.
Proof. Although the process (N(t)) is typically not Markov, when N(t) = m the
conditional intensity of a transition m→ m−1 is at least δ
(
m
2
)
, so (i) follows by
comparison with the Kingman chain result (5). Similarly, write T(r) = min{t :
N(t) ≤ r} and TKing(r) for the corresponding quantity for the Kingman chain.
Then
P(N(t) > r) = P(T(r) > t)
≤ t−1ET(r)
≤ δ−1t−1ETKing(r) by comparison with the Kingman chain.
And
ETKing(r) =
n∑
m=r+1
1/
(
m
2
)
≤ 2/r.
So (ii) follows by comparison. A similar argument, calculating var(TKing(r) ) and
using Chebyshev’s inequality, establishes (iii). Assertion (iv) follows from the
martingale property (Lemma 2.1(i)) of (Xi(t)), applying the optional sampling
theorem at time T .
2.3 The augmented process
Given a probability distribution π = (πi) on the set Agents of n agents with
each πi > 0, take independent random variables ηi with Exponential(πi) distri-
butions. Define a random ordering ≺ on Agents by
i ≺ j if ηi < ηj . (6)
This is one of several equivalent definitions of the size-biased random ordering
[9] associated with π. For instance, defining a random bijection F : {1, . . . , n} →
Agents by
P(F (1) = i) = πi
P(F (2) = j|F (1) = i) = πj/(1− πi), j 6= i
P(F (3) = k|F (1) = i, F (2) = j) = πk/(1− πi − πj), {i, j, k} distinct
. . .
and so on, then the size-biased random ordering could be defined as
i ≺ j if F−1(i) < F−1(j). (7)
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We want to consider the standardized CG process with some initial configuration
x(0) = (xi(0)). Take the size-biased random ordering ≺ on Agents associated
with the probabiity distribution x(0). Conditional on the realization of ≺, we
can define a variation of the CG process in which, when two agents i, j with
non-zero money meet, the winner is always the agent who comes earlier in ≺ (if
i ≺ j then i is the winner). In other words, the transition rates (3) become
x→ x(j,k) at rate νjk if min(xj , xk) > 0 and j ≺ k. (8)
Call this the augmented process (X(t),≺) with initial state (x(0),≺). Note
that the random order ≺ does not change with time. See below for a way
of visualizing this process in the simple setting. The next lemma says that
unconditionally, that is when we do not see the realization of ≺, we see the CG
process.
Lemma 2.3. In the augmented process ((X(t),≺), 0 ≤ t <∞) with initial state
(x(0),≺), the component (X(t), 0 ≤ t < ∞) evolves as the standardized CG
process with initial configuration x(0).
Proof. Recall the elementary facts that, for independent Exponential r.v.’s η1, η2
with rates λ1, λ2,
P(η1 < η2) =
η1
η1+η2
(9)
the conditional dist. of η1 given η1 < η2 is Exponential(η1 + η2). (10)
Implement the augmented process using the order ≺ at (6) given by independent
Exponential(xi(0)) r.v.’s (ηi, i ∈ Agents). Write F(t) = σ(X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t),
and note this does not include the random order ≺. We claim that for each t
conditional on F(t), the r.v.’s (ηi : i ∈ Agents, Xi(t) > 0) are
independent Exponentials with rates Xi(t).
It is enough to check this remains true inductively over meetings. If agents i and
j meet at t with non-zero fortunes Xi(t−) and Xj(t−), then by the evolution
rule for the augmented process
on the event {ηi < ηj} we haveXi(t) = Xi(t−)+Xj(t−) andXj(t) =
0
and similarly on the complementary event. By inductive hypothesis ηi and ηj
are independent Exponentials of rates Xi(t−) and Xj(t−); fact (10) then says
that ηi has Exponential Xi(t) distribution and the induction goes through.
Having established the claim, consider again what happens when agents i
and j meet at t with non-zero fortunes Xi(t−) and Xj(t−). The probability
that the update is to Xi(t) = Xi(t−)+Xj(t−) and Xj(t) = 0 (and similarly for
the complementary event) is the probability of the event {ηi < ηj}, which by
the claim and (9) equals Xi(t−)/(Xi(t−) +Xj(t−)). But this is the dynamics
of the CG process.
See [10] for uses of this result in the context of the metric coalescent.
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2.4 The token process
For the special case of a simple CG process, there is a more concrete and in-
formative expansion of the notion of augmented process above. First, here is
a story which might help visualize what is going on. (In talks we ask several
audience members to each place an actual currency note on the table, so we
can demonstrate the story.) Real-world currency notes have serial numbers;
imagine each agent starting with one note with a random serial number, so that
the ranking (smallest to largest) of the n notes is uniform random. When two
agents with non-zero money meet, we specify that the agent who wins the game
is determined as the agent who possesses, in their collection at that time, the
smallest-ranked note. The winner adds the loser’s notes to his pile of notes.
In the story, each agent has a set of notes, but what is relevant is not the
precise serial numbers but the relative rankings of each of the n serial numbers.
In the formalization below, (Si(t)) is the set of rankings of all the notes owned
by agent i at time t.
Note this story is consistent with the “simple” case of Lemma 2.3, which is
essentially the context where we record only the relative orders of each agent’s
smallest-ranked note. But in contrast to Lemma 2.3, what we do next is useful
only in the “simple” context.
To formalize the story above, given meeting rates (νij , i, j ∈ Agents) we first
take a uniform random bijection F : {1, . . . , n} → Agents. Visualize tokens
1, . . . , n being randomly dealt to the agents. Define a process S(t) = (Si(t), i ∈
Agents) to have initial configuration
Si(0) = {F
−1(i)}, i ∈ Agents
and transition rates (copying (8))
S→ S(j,k) at rate νjk if Sj and Sk non-empty and minSj < minSk (11)
where
S
(j,k)
j = Sj ∪ Sk, S
(j,k)
k = ∅, S
(j,k)
i = Si for i 6= j, k.
So Si(t) is just the set of tokens held by agent i at time t, and at a meeting the
game is always won by the owner of the smallest (lowest-ranked) token. Call
(S(t), 0 ≤ t <∞) the token process, and write
X(t) = (|Si(t)|, i ∈ Agents); F(t) = σ(X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
As discussed above, Lemma 2.3 implies
Corollary 2.4. In the token process (S(t), 0 ≤ t < ∞), the process X(t) :=
(|Si(t)|, i ∈ Agents) evolves as the simple CG process.
As mentioned earlier, Corollary 2.4 plays a key role in the development of the
metric coalescent in [10]. And we will see in sections 2.6 and 3 how it enables
us to use simple intuitive arguments in our discrete setting. Corollary 2.4 is
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reminiscent of the Donnelly-Kurtz look-down construction [8] but we do not see
a precise connection.
Lemma 2.5 below says: if we just see the number of tokens that each agent
has, then the assignment of tokens to agents is uniform over possible assign-
ments.
Lemma 2.5. In the token process, for each t, the conditional distribution of
(Si(t), i ∈ Agents) given F(t) is uniform over all partitions (Bi, i ∈ Agents)
of {1, . . . , n} with |Bi| = Xi(t) ∀i.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 2.3, it is enough to check that the asser-
tion remains true inductively over meetings. Given that Sj1(t) and Sj2(t) are
non-empty, the event of a meeting of (j1, j2) in (t, t + dt) is independent of
(Sj1(t), Sj2(t)). Such a meeting causes either Sj1 or Sj2 to become Sj1(t)∪Sj2 (t)
and the other to become empty. Now checking that the induction goes through
reduces to checking the following elementary fact about merging components of
uniform random partitions, which we leave to the reader.
Take (ni, i ∈ I) with each ni ≥ 1 and
∑
i ni = n. Take two elements
j1, j2 of I, write j0 for a new symbol and let I
′ := (I \ {j1, j2}) ∪ {j0} and
nj0 = nj1 + nj2 . Take a uniform random partition (Bi, i ∈ I) of {1, . . . , n} into
components with |Bi| = ni ∀i ∈ I. Construct a random partition (B′i, i ∈ I
′)
by setting Bj0 = Bj1 ∪Bj2 and B
′
i = Bi for other i. Then
(i) (B′i, i ∈ I
′) is a uniform random partition of {1, . . . , n} into components with
|B′i| = ni ∀i ∈ I
′;
(ii) The event “the minimum element of Bj1 is smaller than the minimum ele-
ment of Bj2” is independent of the random partition (B
′
i, i ∈ I
′).
In applying this fact in our setting, the point is that the information revealed
by the change in X(·) at the meeting is precisely the identity of j1, j2 and
whether the event in (ii) occurs, but conditioning on these does not destroy
uniformity.
A more detailed treatment is given in [10] section 2.4.
2.5 Moment calculations
Lemma 2.5 allows us to do various calculations with a simple CG process, such as
the second-moment calculations below. Recall that (by the martingale property)
we know EXi(t) ≡ 1.
Lemma 2.6. For a simple CG process,
E[Xi(t)Xj(t)] = exp(−νijt), j 6= i. (12)
E[Xi(t)(Xi(t)− 1)] =
∑
j 6=i
(1− exp(−νijt)). (13)
So for f : Agents→ R we have
E
(∑
i
fiXi(t)
)
2
=
∑
i
f2i
[
1 +
∑
j 6=i(1− exp(−νijt))
]
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i fifj exp(−νijt)).
(14)
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Proof. Lemma 2.5 gives
P(1 ∈ Si(t), 2 ∈ Sj(t)|F(t)) =
Xi(t)Xj(t)
n(n− 1)
and taking expectation
P(1 ∈ Si(t), 2 ∈ Sj(t)) =
1
n(n− 1)
E[Xi(t)Xj(t)].
From the dynamics of the token process, the event {1 ∈ Si(t), 2 ∈ Sj(t)} happens
if and only if F (1) = i, F (2) = j and τij > t, where τij is the first meeting time
of i and j. So
P(1 ∈ Si(t), 2 ∈ Sj(t)) =
1
n(n− 1)
P(τij > t).
These last two identities give (12). One can deduce (13) from (12) and the
“martingale” fact E|Si(t)| = 1, but let us see how it follows by the same kind of
argument as above. Lemma 2.5 gives
P({1, 2} ⊆ Si(t)|F(t)) =
Xi(t)(Xi(t)− 1)
n(n− 1)
and taking expectation
P({1, 2} ⊆ Si(t)) =
1
n(n− 1)
E[Xi(t)(Xi(t)− 1)].
From the dynamics of the token process, the event {{1, 2} ⊆ Si(t)} happens if
and only if F (1) = i and F (2) = some j for which τij ≤ t, and so
P({1, 2} ⊆ Si(t)) =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
P(τij ≤ t).
These last two identities give (13). Finally, (14) follows from (12) and (13) by
expanding the square.
2.6 Elementary properties of the simple CG process
Here we prove the remaining “mostly obvious” assertions about the simple CG
process from section 1.1, and some minor extensions. Fix a meeting model (νij)
on n agents. Write G for the graph whose edges are the pairs (i, j) with νij > 0.
Recall G is connected by assumption. An anticlique (or independent set) in G is
a set A of vertices such that there is no edge with both end-vertices in A. There
is a finite set of configurations x that can be reached by the simple CG process.
Such a configuration is absorbing if and only if {i : xi ≥ 1} is an anticlique.
The process must reach some absorbing configuration at some a.s. finite time
T , because N(t) (the number of solvent agents) decreases by one every time
the configuration changes. Write T for the random set of agents with non-zero
money at T .
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Lemma 2.7. For the simple CG process:
(i) ET ≤ (n− 1)/δ, where δ := min{νij : νij > 0}.
(ii) For each pair {i, j} with νij = 0 we have P(i and j ∈ T ) ≥
2
n(n−1) .
(iii) P(i ∈ T ) ≥ 11+d(i) and so E|T | ≥
∑
i
1
1+d(i) , where d(i) is the degree of
vertex i in G.
(iv) P(|T | = 1) > 0.
Note that, if νij = 0 for some pair {i, j}, then (ii) implies P(|T | = 1) < 1.
Proof. If N(t) = m and the configuration is not an anticlique then the con-
ditional intensity of a transition m → m − 1 is at least δ, implying (i) by
comparison with the pure death process with constant transition rate δ. For
(ii) consider the token process from section 2.4. If νij = 0 then with probability
1/
(
n
2
)
agents i and j have tokens 1 and 2; if so, then neither can lose a game,
so both must end in T . Similarly for (iii), with probability 1/(1 + d(i)) agent
i’s token is smaller than all its d(i) neighbors’ tokens; if so, then agent i cannot
lose a game, implying i ∈ T . So P(i ∈ T ) ≥ 1/(1+d(i)), which is (iii). For (iv),
consider a spanning tree for G. We can order its edges as
e1 = (ℓ1, v1), e2 = (ℓ2, v2), . . . en−1 = (ℓn−1, vn−1)
in such a way that each ℓi is a leaf of the subtree in which edges e1, . . . , ei−1
have been deleted. With non-zero probability, the first n − 1 meetings in the
meeting process are over the edges e1, . . . , en−1 in that order; and with non-zero
probability, the game involving (ℓi, vi) is won by vi for each i. If this happens
then vn−1 ends up with all the money.
3 The sparse graph setting
Consider a connected finite graph G with n vertices and which is r-regular, for
r ≥ 3 (so if r is odd then n must be even). Take the set Agents as the vertices
of G, and the meeting rates as
νij = 1 if (i, j) is an edge (15)
= 0 if not.
As observed in section 1.1, the simple CG process must terminate in a random
configuration X∗ with some random set T of solvent agents. We study the
density of solvent agents:
ρ(G) := n−1E|T |.
What are the possible values of ρ(G), in terms of n and r? Consider first the
lower bound.
Lemma 3.1. (i) ρ(G) ≥ 1r+1 .
(ii) If n is a multiple of r then there exists a graph G such that
ρ(G) ≤ 1r (1 +
2κr
r−1)
where κr, defined by (16) below, is such that κr ↑ κ∞ <∞ as r ↑ ∞.
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Proof. Assertion (i) repeats Lemma 2.7(iii). For (ii), consider the graph G
constructed as follows. Take n/r disjoint graphs C1, . . . , Cn/r, each being the
complete graph on r vertices with one edge (ai, bi) removed. Then add edges
(b1, a2), (b2, a3), . . . , (bn/r, a1) to make G.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n/r, the only possible way for T to contain more than one
vertex of Ci is for T to contain the two vertices {ai, bi} (because any other pair
of agents in Ci will meet). It follows that
ρ(G) ≤ 1r (1 + q)
where q is defined as the probability of the event {ai, bi} ⊆ T . To study q we
use the token process representation from section 2.4. The only way that the
event {ai, bi} ⊆ T can occur is if one of {ai, bi} has the smallest token amongst
agents Ci. So
q ≤ 2r−1
r∑
m=2
qm
where qm is the probability that T does contain both ai and bi, given that ai
has the smallest and bi has the m’th smallest token amongst agents Ci. But this
latter event can only happen if, in the sequence of games involving the agents
initially holding these m tokens, bi is never involved, which has probability
m−3∏
i=0
(
m−i−1
2
)
(
m−i
2
)
− 1
= σm, say.
So now we have shown
q ≤ 2r−1
r∑
m=2
σm.
But σm decreases as order m
−2, establishing the bound in (ii) for
κr =
r∑
m=2
σm. (16)
Finding somewhat tight upper bounds complementary to those in Lemma
3.1 seems more difficult. As noted in section 1.3, we can consider the simple CG
process on the infinite r-ary tree Tr, and the random set T of solvent agents in
the t→∞ limit has some density
ρ(Tr) := P(i ∈ T ).
It is well-known [7] that there exist, for fixed r ≥ 3, sequences (Gn,r, n ≥ n0(r))
of r-regular n-vertex connected graphs (derived e.g. from typical realizations of
random r-regular graphs) which converge in the sense of local weak convergence
(Benjamini-Schramm convergence) to Tr, and for such a sequence we will have
lim
n
ρ(Gn,r) = ρ(Tr). (17)
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By analyzing the CG process on Tr we will show (Corollary 3.5) that ρ(Tr) ∼
2/r as r → ∞. Granted that result, we can summarize Lemma 3.1 and the
discussion above as follows.
Proposition 3.2. Define
a∗(r) = sup
(Gn,r)
lim sup
n
ρ(Gn,r)
a∗(r) = inf
(Gn,r)
lim inf
n
ρ(Gn,r)
the sup and inf over sequences (Gn,r, n ≥ n0(r)) of r-regular n-vertex connected
graphs. Then
a∗(r) ∼
1
r
as r→∞
a∗(r) ≥
2− o(1)
r
as r →∞.
We conjecture that in fact a∗(r) ∼ 2/r as r →∞, in other words that locally
tree-like graphs are asymptotically extremal for this problem.
3.1 Finite trees
Consider the simple CG process on a finite tree T, with the constant meeting
rates (15) over edges. We establish a recursion, Lemma 3.3, for the distribu-
tion of X(T,o)(t), the fortune of agent o at time t. The CG process uses only
the first meeting times τe across edges, which are independent with Exponen-
tial(1) distribution; by a deterministic time-change we can suppose instead the
distribution is Uniform(0,1), simplifying calculations below.
For 0 ≤ t, z ≤ 1, set
φ(T,o)(z, t) := 1− E
[
zX(T,o)(t)
]
.
For a neighbor i of o (written i ∼ o), we let Ti denote the subtree of T (as
viewed from root o) consisting of i and all its descendants.
Lemma 3.3. For 0 ≤ z, t ≤ 1,
φ(T,o)(z, t) =
∫ 1
z
∏
i∼o
(
1−
∫ t
0
φ(Ti,i)(ξ, u)du
)
dξ.
Proof. Let Y (t) denote the fortune of agent o at time t in the modified process
where o systematically wins every game she plays. Clearly,
Y (t)
d
= 1 +
∑
i∼o
X(Ti,i)(τoi)1{τoi≤t}, (18)
with the terms in the sum being independent. The original process can be
coupled with the modified process in the natural way, such that they coincide
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as long as o has not lost a game (in the original process). Hence, almost surely
under this coupling,
X(T,o)(t) = Y (t) or X(T,o)(t) = 0.
From the “fair game” structure of the CG process we know E
[
X(T,o)(t)
]
= 1.
But conditioning on the times of meetings does not alter the “fair game” struc-
ture; and because the times of meetings determine Y (t), we have E
[
X(T,o)(t) | Y (t)
]
=
1. So the conditional distribution of X(T,o)(t) given Y (t) must be
X(T,o)(t) =
{
Y (t) w.p 1/Y (t)
0 w.p 1− 1/Y (t).
.
Hence,
φ(T,o)(z, t) = E [E[1−z
X(T,o)(t)|Y ] ] = E
[
1− zY (t)
Y (t)
]
=
∫ 1
z
E
[
ξY (t)−1
]
dξ. (19)
Now (18) gives
E
[
ξY (t)−1
]
=
∏
i∼o
(
1−
∫ t
0
φ(Ti,i)(ξ, u)du
)
and substituting into (19) completes the proof.
3.2 Infinite trees
In the specific contexts below it is straightforward to make rigorous our use of
the simple CG process with an infinite number of agents and of the local weak
convergence results (17,27) relating finite and infinite graphs, and we do not
give details. Instead we focus on trying to do explicit calculations.
The infinite d-ary tree. We next consider the case where (T, o) is the infinite
d−ary tree rooted at o, that is each vertex has d ≥ 1 children. Writing
φd(z, t) = 1− E
[
zX(T,o)(t)
]
(20)
Lemma 3.3 gives the functional identity
φd(z, t) =
∫ 1
z
(
1−
∫ t
0
φd(ξ, u)du
)d
dξ. (21)
We could not determine φd(z, t) explicitly, but we will establish the following
bounds, which are sufficient to obtain asymptotics as d→∞.
Lemma 3.4. Setting εd =
2
d log
(
1 + d2
)
< 1, we have for 0 ≤ z, t ≤ 1 and
d ≥ 1,
2(1− z)(1− εd)
2(1− εd) + d(1 − z)t
≤ φd(z, t) ≤
2(1− z)
2 + d(1 − z)t
.
In particular, P(X(T,o)(1) 6= 0) = φd(0, 1) ∼ 2/d as d→∞.
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Proof. First note that, by (21),
−
∂φd
∂t
(z, t) = d
∫ 1
z
φd(ξ, t)
(
1−
∫ t
0
φd(ξ, u)du
)d−1
dξ,
whereas, using again (21) and the fact that φd(1, t) ≡ 0,
(φd(z, t))
2
= −2
∫ 1
z
φd(ξ, t)
∂φd
∂z
(ξ, t)dξ
= 2
∫ 1
z
φd(ξ, t)
(
1−
∫ t
0
φd(ξ, u)du
)d
dξ.
Combining these two identities, we obtain
∂(1/φd)
∂t
(z, t) =
d
2
×
∫ 1
z
φd(ξ, t)
(
1−
∫ t
0
φd(ξ, u)du
)d−1
dξ
∫ 1
z φd(ξ, t)
(
1−
∫ t
0 φd(ξ, u)du
)d
dξ
. (22)
Since φd is [0, 1]−valued, we see that
∂(1/φd)
∂t
(z, t) ≥
d
2
.
Integrating with respect to t gives
1
φd(z, t)
≥
1
φd(z, 0)
+
td
2
=
1
1− z
+
td
2
which rearranges to the claimed upper bound. From this upper bound, it follows
that for 0 ≤ z, t ≤ 1,
∫ t
0
φd(z, u)du ≤ εd, (23)
which we may plug into (22) to obtain:
∂(1/φd)
∂t
(z, t) ≤
d
2
×
1
1− εd
.
Integrating with respect to t gives
1
φd(z, t)
≤
1
φd(z, 0)
+
td
2(1− εd)
=
1
1− z
+
td
2(1− εd)
which rearranges to the claimed lower bound.
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The r−regular tree. The r−regular infinite tree consists of r copies of a
(r−1)−ary tree, connected to a root. Letting φ∗r(z, t) denote the corresponding
function, as at (20), the general recursion from Lemma 3.3 gives
φ∗r(z, t) =
∫ 1
z
(
1−
∫ t
0
φr−1(ξ, u)du
)r
dξ.
Comparing with (21) and using (23), it follows that
(1− εr−1)φr−1 ≤ φ
∗
r ≤ φr−1,
so that φ∗r satisfies the same r→∞ asymptotics as does φr−1. In particular,
Corollary 3.5. On the r−regular infinite tree Tr, the probability ρ(Tr) =
φ∗r(0, 1) that a given agent finishes with non-zero money is 2/r + o(1/r) as
r →∞.
Galton-Watson trees. When the rooted tree (T, o) is a random Galton-
Watson tree with degree distribution {πn : n ≥ 0}, the general recursion from
Lemma 3.3 immediately leads to a recursive distributional equation for the
annealed generating function
φ(z, t) := 1− E
[
zX(T,o)(t)
]
,
where expectation is now taken with respect to both the randomness of the
rooted tree and the randomness of the CG process. Letting Fpi(x) =
∑
n πnx
n
denote the degree generating function of the Galton-Watson tree, we readily
obtain:
φ(z, t) =
∫ 1
z
Fpi
(
1−
∫ t
0
φ(ξ, u)du
)
dξ. (24)
Extracting useful information from this equation for a general distribution {πn :
n ≥ 0} remains an open problem.
3.3 The Poisson-Galton-Watson tree, the sparse Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graph and the short-time behavior of the King-
man coalescent
In the case where {πn : n ≥ 0} is the Poisson distribution with mean c ≥ 0
(i.e. Fpi(z) = e
cx−c), equation (24) can be easily solved, yielding the following
explicit formula:
φ(z, t) =
2(1− z)
2 + c(1− z)t
.
Identifying this generating function, we find that the fortune X(t) of the agent
at the root has distribution specified by
P(X(t) > 0) = 22+ct (25)
the conditional distribution of X(t) given X(t) > 0 is Geometric( 22+ct ).(26)
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Because the Poisson-Galton-Watson tree T∗c is the local weak limit of the sparse
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph G(n, c/n) we can deduce
Eρ(G(n, c/n))→ Eρ(T∗c) = P(X(1) > 0) =
2
2+c . (27)
Let us outline an interesting alternative explanation of why (25, 26) arise here.
Under our time-change (first meetings occur at Uniform(0, 1) random times)
the simple CG process on G(n, c/n) arises from a two-stage construction: for
each edge e of the complete graph on n vertices, first select e with probability
c/n, then (if selected) assign the Uniform random meeting time. But the set
of meetings that occur before time t ∈ [0, 1] can alternatively be described by:
for each edge e of the complete graph, a meeting has occured with chance ct/n,
independently over e, and meetings occured at independent Uniform times.
Now consider the Kingman coalescent, in the spirit of more general stochas-
tic coalescence models [3, 4, 5, 6], as a process of coalescing partitions of
{1, 2, . . . , n}, being the special case in which each pair of blocks merges at
constant rate. But take this rate to be 1/n instead of 1. The n → ∞ limit
distribution of block sizes at time τ in this short-time limit regime is known
to be Geometric( 22+τ ) – see Construction 5 in [3] for an intuitive explanation
in terms of a process of coalescing intervals on Z. But in our “CG process on
G(n, c/n)” above, the process of fortunes of the solvent agents, considered as a
process indexed by τ = ct, evolves in essentially the same way as the process of
block sizes in this Kingman coalescent, so (26) is ultimately equivalent to the
short-time Geometric limit result for the Kingman coalescent.
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